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Samuelson’s Model of Money
with n-Period Lifetimes
AUL SAMUELSON’S OVERLAPPING genera-
tions model is a classic in modern economic
literature. It has enjoyed a renaissance in the
last decade or so as a framework for analyzing
fundamental issues in many areas of economics,
including pure theory, public finance and, of
special concern for this paper, monetary theory.’
Samuelson’s (1958) model continues to attract
interest in the latter field because it has the
potential to offer a convincing explanation of
why unbacked paper currency has value without
resort to special assumptions.’ This paper will
focus on the value of paper currency in a
generalized version of Samuelson’s otiginal
approach.
Samuelson’s essential insight was to introduce
demographic structure. The economic actors in
the model actually die, so that people have finite
planning horizons even though the economy
itself continues without end. This is in stark
contrast to the immortal people that occupy the
chief rival models in use in macroeconomics
today, most of which are sophisticated versions
of growth models pioneered by Ramsey (1928)
and Solow (1956). Yet, while these rivals in the
1980s have begun confronting the data directly,
the overlapping generations approach for the
most part remains the province of theorists.’
This is so primarily because a “time period,”
instead of being interpretable as a month ot’ a
quarter, has a biological basis as a fraction of
an adult human lifetime; in standard two-period
formulations, it would be interpreted literally
as something on the order of 25 or 30 years.
Conventional data sets preclude most empirical
analysis on such a time scale. This fact forms
the foundation for a great deal of criticism of
the overlapping generations approach.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that
some of the key results from conventional over-
lapping generations models in which agents live
for two periods extend surprisingly well to the
case where agents live for many periods—at
least for the example studied here. Consequently,
some of the typical criticisms of Samuelson’s
model of money should exert less force on
economists than they commonly do- In addition,
the n-period approach opens the possibility,
I See, for instance, Wallace (1980).
2Special assumptions that have been used include placing
money in the utility function, or imposing a cash-in-advance
constraint on the purchase of some goods. For discus-
sions of these alternative approaches, see Sargent (1987).
‘See Kydland and Prescott (1962) for an example of com-
paring the predictions of a Ramsey-Solow model with data.68
already pursued by some researchers, of con-
fronting overlapping generations models with
available data front macroeconomic time series.
Recent general theoretical results on n-period
overlapping generations models are developed
in Kehoe, el aL (1991) and Aiyagari (1988, 1939).4
This paper illustrates sonic key points developed
by these authors. Some results are new, how-
ever, especially those concerning the conditions
for fiat currency to have value in equilibrium.
In particular, previous studies have suggested
that, if the people in the model discount the
future, letting the number of periods in the
model become arbitrarily large implies that fiat
money cannot be valued in equilibrium.’ Since
most economists believe that people in real
economies do discount the future, this result
seemed to sink hopes that the overlapping
generations approach could convincingly explain
why unbacked paper currency has value. The
results presented here suggest, in contrast, that
discounting the future is actually less important
than the previous research seemed to suggest.
The condition for fiat currency to have value in
equilibrium in the n-period model is instead
found to be analogous to the condition in the
two-period model. In fact, there is a sense in
which adding periods to a model with discount-
ing makes it easier, instead of more difficult, to
satisfy the condition.
Whether fiat currency has value in equilibrium
also depends on the lifetime productivity profiles
of the economic actors in the model.~A stand-
ard result from the two-period model is that
this profile would have to be declining over a
person’s lifetime in order for fiat currency to be
valued in equilibrium! In actual economies,
however, productivity tends to rise with age,
dt-opping off quickly only near retirement.
A key result of the present paper is that in
the n-period model fiat money can still be
valued when the lifetime productivity profile
is plausibly hump-shaped.
The results described above, it should be em-
phasized, are based entirely on an example in
which the preferences of the people in the
model are described by particularly simple func-
tions.8 This allows key results to be derived
algebraically. The model will be described in the
following section. The results concerning the
existence of stationary equilibria and the condi-
tions for fiat currency to be valued are described
subsequently, and will be contrasted and com-
pared to the conventional two-period case.
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Given a disturbing disadvantage such as an in-
appropriately long time period, one might won-
der if retaining the overlapping generations
framework is worthwhile. But Samuelson’s
approach has important advantages that have
induced continuing interest in the model, time
period problems notwithstanding. A few of
these positive aspects will be reviewed here.
In Samuelson’s model, a new generation is
born in every period, at the same time that the
oldest generation dies. This structure implies a
certain heterogeneity among individuals, where
younger people have a relatively long horizon in
which to wot* and save, and older people have
a relatively short horizon. One can infer that
this will affect the way these people behave.
Although heterogeneity of this type is a feature
of observed economies, it is absent from most
competing models.°
As has already been emphasized, fiat money--
intrinsically worthless pieces of paper issued by
the government—can have value in equilibrium
in Samuelson’s model without resort to special
assumptions. This is the primary reason mone-
tary theorists have paid close attention to the
model. In contrast, the Ramsey-Solow model
generally does not admit equilibria with valued
fiat money unless special assumptions are invoked.
~Strictly speaking, the Kehoe, et at (1991) results apply to
“large square economies,” that is, those with many goods
and many participants, but where consumers live for only
two periods. However, they argue that, analytically speak-
ing, these models are equivalent to those with, say, a
single good and n-period lifetimes.
~Thisis an oversimplification; more exact statements will be
made in the next section.
°Theseare represented by the endowment patterns in the
subsequent analysis.
7This is also an oversimplification, the meaning of which will
be clarified in the discussion of the model.
People will be endowed with logarithmic, time-separable
utility functions.
9There are some models in which all people have infinite
lives but heterogeneity of a similar type plays a role.
See, for instance, Becker and Foias (1987).There ar-c two stationary equilibria in conven-
tional versions of Samuelson’s two-period
model.’’ One is the monetary steady state,
where fiat currency has value and the price
level is constant (pt-ovided the currency stock is
constant). ‘I’he other is the autarkic (no trade)
steady state, where fiat currency has no value
(currency is not held) and the price level grows
without bound. One concern ahout n-period
versions of the overlapping generations model
has been that the number of stationary
equilibria might multiply uncontrollably as n
increased to a value that would allow researchers
to interpret a time period as, say, a quarter.
Presumably, if one thinks of adult lifetimes as
55 or 60 years, n would have to he 220 or 240
for such an inierpretation to be valid. It is
therefore somewhat surprising that the version
of the n-period model examined heie has only
two stationary equilibria, and that these are the
analogs of the two steady states that exist when
n =2.”
The fact that two steady states can exist is
important, because the conventional overlapping
genet-ations model also serves as a classic example
of a ft-amework that may produce inefficient
equilibria.” The monetary steady state can he
an imptovement (that is, everyone in the model
can be made better off) over the autarkic
equilibrium. Therefore, the intt-oduction of fiat
currency by the government can represent a
welfai-e-improving intervention. Hence, there is
scope in Samnuelson’s model for a discussion of a
policy role for the government—another con-
trast with generic versions of the Ramsey-Solow
model. An analysis of welfare will not be under-
taken in this paper, however.
Some (;uicOiois
Many critics of Samuelson’s model have argued
that the two-period lifetime assumption, or
aspects related to it, make it an unsatisfactory
model of money. One critic is ‘Fobin (1980), who
lists several reasons why, in his opinion, the
two-period overlapping generations model is a
“pat-able,” not a serious model of money. Among
Tobin’s reasons is that identifting money as an
asset that would be held for 25 years is “slightly
ridiculous,” in part because “the average holding
period of a dollar of demand deposits is about
two days.” He also suggests that the real world
analog of the asset in the model might he better
viewed as land. Social security schemes, in
‘robin’s view, would he better- mechanisms for
accomplishing intergenerational transfers be-
tween the old and the young. In short, the
“money” in the overlapping generations model,
according to Tohin, “is not the money of com-
mon parlance.” Since all of these criticisms are
tied to the notion that the time period in the
model is very long, an n-period model in which
the pet’iod could he much shorter, hut could
share conclusions similar to the two-period
model, presumably would allay some of these
concerns.
Another aspect of the time period prohletn
and its treatment in the literature deserves
mention. Some authors have argued that many
of the central insights would carr’y over from
the two-period case to the n-period case and
that, for clarity’s sake, the two-period model
should be the version of choice. ‘I’hus, McCallum
(1983) asserted that “some propetties of two-
period overlapping genet-ations models will carry
over to versions in which a larger number of
phases of life are recognized.” Similarly, Friedman
and Hahn (1990) state that
[O]vet’lapping generations models at-c both
more robust and more intet-esting than is
sometimes believed Of course, the
postulate of two-period lives is highly
unrealistic. On the other hand, it is diffi-
cult to think of a qualitative conclusion of
these models -.-that is plausibly at risk
from more realistic life times -.-. Thete
may -.- he a difference in qualitative
conclusions as one passes from finitely to
infinitely lived agents. It takes, however,
a peculiar perception of the world to
regard the latter as the more “realistic’
approach.”
From this perspective, it is valuable to find
out to what extent such assertions are correct,
10Stationary equilibria will be defined in the next section.
“More general versions of this result can be found in Kehoe,
et al. (1991).
“That is, there may be Pareto suboptimal competitive
equilibria.
“Friedman and Hahn (1990), p. xiv. Italics in original.70
and thus to what extent two-period models can
be viewed as elegant repi-esentations of n-period
models.”
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‘l’he model economy that will be studied in
this paper endures forever.’’ It consists of
agents who live for a fixed number of periods
and are endowed at each of these dates with
various amounts of a consumption good. The mod-
el economy consists only of these endowments—
thei-e is no production.” The agents have a
government that endures forever. A new gener-
ation of agents is born each per-iod, at the same
time the oldest generation dies.
‘I’he agents make decisions about how much
to consume and save. There are a = I -- -
agents within a generation, so that qi s the
population size of the generation horn at time (.
Population sizes of generations born in previous
periods are denoted by q,,, q,, q,,,,,, where
n 2 is the number of periods in an agent’s life.
‘I’he total population alive at time I is given by
The (exogenously given) gross r’ate
of population gt’o%vth is denoted by a, so that
~ ~ q,..1.
An agent horn at time £ is said to be “of
generation i.’ Birth dates are denoted by sub-
script time.’~The single consumption good is
perishable, so that agents are unable to store it
for future sale. The endowments of agent a of
generation I are denoted by w~(I)at time i,
w~ (i + 1) at titne I + 1,...,and w~U + n — 1) at time
I + ii — 1. Endowments cannot he negative.
Lifetime consumption of agent a of generation
I is denoted by c~(t),c~’(I + 1) c’:(t + Ti — 1).
The agents pay lump sum taxes (r’eceive trans-
fers if r > 0) of T~(d,t~(t+I) x’;(I +n —1).
After-tax endowments, defined as endowments
less taxes, are denoted by mi’~(t),~‘~Q+ 1),...,
~‘~(t÷n—I). Later in the analysis, these taxes will
be set to zero, but for now they serve to moti-
vate a role for government. The agents are not
connected in any way; they care only about
their own lifetime consuniption and they do not
leave bequests to future generations.”
The market for loans is the heart of this
model economy. Agent a of generation t could
boriow from or lend to agents in the same
cohort or the government. In addition, an
individual agent could borrow from or lend to
agents in other- cohorts living at date I, except
for the agents that are in their last period of
life. Because those agents will die, they will not
be able to repay debts or’ collect loans—hence,
they will not participate in the loan market.
The government could lend or borrow on a
mnultiperiod basis, instead of limiting itself to
one-period instruments, even when agents live
for only two periods. For instance, a young
agent might buy a multiperiod bond from the
government, even though the maturity date is
beyond the agent’s lifetime, because there may
be a secondary market in bonds. Similarly,
multiperiod loans could exist in the private
market, either because both agents involved will
be alive for the duration of the contract or
because a secondary market exists for private
loans. Despite all of these possibilities, the loan
market in this paper will be restricted to one-
period contracts. ‘l’his assumption is made for
two reasons. One is that, in the two-period
version of this model, the existence of multiperiod
governnient bonds does not change the analysis.
The other is simply a desire to keep the discus-
sion focused.”
“Many authors have considered modifications of the over-
lapping generations approach in order to reinterpret the
time period in the model or avoid the time period problem
altogether. See, for instance, Btanchard (1985) and Wood-
ford (1989). Some authors have worked directly on extend-
ing versions of the overlapping generations model to a
large number of periods, although not usually with money
included. A prominent example is the work of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), who have simulated 55-period
models, interpreting the time period as a year, in order to
analyze fiscal policies. Attig and Carlstrom (1991) have
used a similar strategy to analyze certain aspects of mone-
tary policy. Their model does not include fiat currency via
the standard approach. Rios-Rutl (1991) calibrates an
n-period overlapping generations modet without money.
“That is, time in the model runs from the infinite past to the
infinite future.
“Considerable literature exists on overlapping generations
models with production, but this paper is limited to a
discussion of endowment economies.
“The notational convention used throughout this paper is
that subscripts denote birthdates, while parentheses denote
real time. For an exposition of the two-period model in
similar notation, see Sargent (1987).
“Bequest motives and storage, both of which are ignored in
this paper, are studied in detail in the literature on two-
period overlapping generations models.
“See McCandtess and Wallace (1991) for a discussion of
multiperiod bonds in a two-period model.An agent is said to save (supply loans) in a
particular period if the after-tax endowment in
that period plus previous period savings and
interest, less consumption in that period, is non-
zero. The agent has no incentive to save in the
n’~ period of life, since death occurs in period
n + 1, but may elect to save in any other period
of life. The savings of agent a of generation I is
denoted by 1U) at time I, l~(t+ 1) at time I + 1,
and so on up to 1’(t+n—2) at time t+n—2.
In order to find the aggregate savings in the
economy at a point in time, it is easiest to look
at the amounts each living generation is saving
at that point in time. These amounts are given by
C (I) = U) - c~U)]
for generation t, and
1U)= ~[*;U) -c~(t)~ +R(t- nLi;U- 1)
for generationf, wherej=t—1 t—n+2.
Aggregate savings at time ti sthe sum of these
sums weighted by the relative size of each
generation. Since the population growth rate is
exogenous and constant, the size of the time
—1 generation relative to the size of the time
generation is 1/a. In this paper, the convention
is adopted that the date t= 0 generation has
size one. Therefore, aggregate savings can be
written as
(1) S(t)=~a’~il (1) ‘—I -
00
Much of the subsequent analysis will be in
terms of aggregate savings.
The government makes purchases of CU)
units of the good and collects the lump-sum
taxes of t~’U)from agent a of generation t at
time I. The government lends L’U) (borrows if
L’(t) is negative) via one-period loans at time t.
Government loans are repaid RU) L’U) at time
+ 1, where RU) is the gross rate of interest on
loans at time t. The government also holds H(t)
> 0 units of paper currency at time I.
The price in currency units of the single good
at time I is denoted PU). The government budget
constraint is given by
CU) + = L~’~w + RU-1) L’(I-1)
“=1
+[HU) —HU — 1)1/PU).
This equation states that government purchases
plus government lending (borrowing) must be
equal to previous lending plus interest earned
(borrowing less interest paid), plus total taxes
collected at date I, plus seigmuorage revenue.
Arbitrage requires that the rate of return on
loans is equal to the rate of return to holding
currency, that is, RU) = PU) IRE +1).” Loan market
equilibrium requires that
SW = flU) IP(t) —
in other words, aggregate savings is equal to
real money balances less government lending or
borrowing.
Denoting real per capita government indehted-
ness as
h( ) — flU) IPU) — L5 (t)
£ -______
and the per capita deficit as
CU) - ~ ~: ,t;U)
_ln —,




RU - ~hU— 1)+ dU).
(3) hU)= a
The right-hand side of equation 2 is per capita
savings. The system described by equations 2
and 3 can be written as
2OThis assumption causes the rate of return on two riskiess
assets, loans to the government and currency, to be
equal. In actual economies, currency is dominated in rate
of return by alternative riskless assets. Eliminating this
problem would require that additional features be added to
the model. Those features will not be pursued in this paper.72
(4) SO) =RU— flSU— 1)
if dU) = 0 at every date t. This is the equation of
concern in the remainder of the paper.
Fixing the deficit, if not to zero, at least to a
constant, is a common way to proceed in
analyzing this system when n = 2. The usual
interpretation of a fixed deficit is that this
provides a way to analyze outcomes holding
fiscal policy constant.
Sargent’s (1987) definition of equilibrium will
he employed:
Definition An equilibrium is a sel of infinile
sequences for population, endowments, tayes,
consumption, private loans, interest rates, govern-
ment eypenditures and government loans such
that
(0 Given a sequence of interest rates, the con-
sumption allocation and the loan amounts
satisfy the agent’s maximizalion problem,
(itt The government budget constraint is
satisfied,
(iii) The loan market clears.
As the introduction emphasized, the value of
fiat currency is the primary focus of this paper.
Because of this focus, government loans,
government purchases and taxes will be set
to zero fom~the remainder of the analysis.
The term hU) is then the real value of currency
holdings per capita, and is equal to aggregate
savings per capita. Government loans, govern-
nient purchases and taxes have been included
up to now to illustrate that the extension of the
model to n periods does not depend on setting
these variables to zero. For many purposes,
such as the analysis of tax effects, one might
want to set H equal to zero instead. That would
he a model without currency. The derivation of
the aggregate savings function 5(t) in the next
portion of the paper would be equally valid for
that model.
l ~ I
According to equation 1, aggregate savings
depends on all of the endowments, both within
and across gener-ations, of all of the agents
living at time t, except those born in period
— n + I. In addition, aggregate savings depends
on the immediate past interest rate RU— 1), and
past savings, while the past savings depended
themselves on past interest rates. Therefore,
aggregate savings depends also on the past
interest rates RU—2),..., RU — n+1). But these are
not the only variables determining aggregate
savings. In analyzing an agent’s maximization
problem, the choice of a consumption plan at
time t will he shown to depend on the agent’s
endowments from time t to time £ + n — 1, as well
as all interest rates from time I to time t+n—2.
The aggregate savings function can therefore be
summarized by saying that it is a function of
interest m’ates arid endowments, both within and
across the lifetimes of the generations alive at
time t.
The fact that so many endowments and interest
rates enter into the aggregate savings function,
coupled with the fact that the aggregate savings
function plays a key role, as indicated by equa-
tion 4, seems to make manageable versions of
the model unlikely without resorting to sophisti-
cated mathematical machinery. Such a view,
while generally correct, is over-lv pessimistic.
Some simplifications can be employed to reduce
the complexity of the aggregate savings function.
One starting point is to assume that all gener-
ations are alike at birth in that they possess the
sane set of pr’eferences and the same lifetime
endowment patterns. This assumption seems at
least superficially reasonable since it is difficult
to argue that any two generations, one horn
m~ightbehind the other, would differ importantly
in their preferences over available goods or
their lifetime productivity profiles, which can be
taken as the interpretation of the endowment
pattern. In mnany applications, generations are
assumed to be identical.
Another simplifying assumption—one that is
somewhat less attractive—is that all agents with-
in a generation are identical. This does not quite
amount to a “representative agent” assumption
for the model, because at any point in time
there would still be differences among agents,
in the sense that some are nearer death than
others. In contrast, many representative agent
models literally have only one agent who lives
forever. Nevertheless, this assumption does
reduce the extent of diversity among agents
considerably.
In order to make progress in writing out an
expression for aggregate savings, then, all
agents within a generation are assumed to be
identical, and all generations are assumed to he
exactly alike in terms of utility functions and
endowment patterns. Furthermore, a par-ticular
utility function will be employed, namely, a time-
separable logam’ithmic utility function given byu’~cyt). c~U +n— t)1 =mn c~U) +/3 in c;’(t+ 1) +
+fl”’ In c~(t+n—1),
where /3 > 0 is a discount factor equal to
11(1+6), and 60 is the rate of time prefer-
ence, also known as the discount rate, of the
agent.”
Under these assumptions, aggregate savings
can be written as”





TI—i -. —, n—I k÷Ii—2~
~=[~H~ u~U+i) H RU+J)’j.
i—0 ~I f—k—I
Aggregate savings therefore depends on a myriad
of endowments and interest rates, as expected.
As written above, it consists of two positive and
two negative terms. The discount factor /3 enters
only in the negative terms. A convenient feature
of this function is that it is linear in the endow-
ments w,U), w,U+ 1) w,U + n—i). That is, suitably
rearranged, the function can be written as a
sum of the endowments with coefficients, and
each coefficient can be viewed as having a posi-
tive pat-t and a negative part. This fact will now
he exploited to interpret the n-period model.
‘ntii •~iAi’ui•iit~: ou i~quu4iii~ti±~
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The artificial economy is described compactly
by equation 4, which is
SU)=RU— 1)50—1).
As has just been shown, S(t) and SO—i) are
actually complicated functions of interest rates
and endowments. The system described by this
equation therefore involves interest rates
extending into the past as well as expected
interest rates extending into the future, but no
other variables. If one assumes that agents
possess perfect foresight or “rational expecta-
tions,” expected interest rates can be replaced
with actual interest rates, and equation 4
becomes a high-order difference equation in
interest rates. Perfect foresight—the assumption
that agents can predict with perfect precision
the future path of interest rates—is an extreme
assumption but is also an important benchmark
for solutions tinder alternative assumptions
about how expectations are formed. In the
remainder of the paper the perfect foresight
assumption will be maintained.
I1~x~is~tna1re and tiniqacansa at’
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under the perfect foresight assumption, then,
equation 4 can be viewed as a high-order differ-
ence equation in interest rates, and stationary
solutions will be those where (4) is satisfied and
RU) = R for all t. These stationary solutions will
be stationary equilibria if they also satisfy the
definition of equilibrium given in the previous
section. Suppose that the interest rate is
constant. Then if R=a, S(t)= kSU—i), so that
the system described by (4) has a stationary
solution at R=a. This stationary solution is one
in which fiat currency could have value, pro-
vided aggregate savings is positive at that
point.” There are also stationary solutions
whenever interest rates are constant and S = 0.
These other solutions involve aggregate savings
equal to zero and thus could not be equilibria
with valued fiat currency. The difference equa-
tion that describes the system is of order 2n —3;
it therefore has as many as 2n — 3 zeros. Along
with the solution at R=a, the system has 2n—2
21The assumption of time-separable logarithmic utility implies
that the goods in the model (actually the same good at
different dates) are gross substitutes (roughly, an increase
in the price of one good increases the demand for all
other goods) and simplifies the discussion of the aggre-
gate savings function without reducing the number of
arguments. in the two-period case, gross substitutes
implies that savings is an increasing function of the rate
of interest. If one relaxes this assumption on the utility
function in the two-period model, so that an increase in
the rate of interest might lead to /ess savings by the
young, cycles and chaos are possible (see Grandmont,
1985). An important aspect of this result is that eliminating
the gross substitutes assumption stilt leaves one with an
acceptable utility function according to standard theory, so
that imposing the assumption, in a sense, is an ad hoc
restriction. Kehoe, et aL (1991) develop alt of their general
results under the gross substitutes condition and discuss
the limitations of the approach at some length.
22The derivation of this expression is given in appendix 1.
To obtain the aggregate savings function when n = 2,
ignore the second and fourth terms.
“See equation 2. This is so because L’ has been set to
zero.Table 1
The Aggregate Savings Function When Interest Rates Are Stationary
S(R) =
w1(t)~1+~+ R0~2i + (1 ÷fl)R (1 +fl+fi2)R2 ~i [ a 1 + p + ~pnl j] a —- a
2 _________________ _______
+
(1 +fl)R (1 +fl+/32)R2 (1 + ... +/3n_2)Rn-2l 1













a [ R~3(1+ p +p 2+ ... +fl~) jJ
[ (1+fl)R(1÷fl+~)R2 (1+...+pm-2)Rn~2ll
___ ____ 2 ____ 1—2 II + Wt(t+n_2)[±2
— [1+ aa _____ ______ a
R~2(1 + p + p2÷ ~pfll)
2 n—2 I — W1(t+fll)[1 + (1÷p)R(1+p+p2)R2 1+...÷p~2)Rn~2l a aa
+ fi + /32÷ ... +j3~)
“candidate equilibria.” It is therefore remarkable
that all but two of these can be ruled out as
equilibria of the model.
One way to find the zeros is to set RU+i)=R
for every i and find the roots of the resulting
high-order polynomial. Such a procedure would
normally require numerical techniques since no
known analytical method for finding the roots
of high-order polynomials exists. Considerable
progress can be made, however, without
explicitly finding all these solutions. ‘to see this,
refer to table 1, which shows the expansion of
the aggregate savings function when RU) = B for
all £. At the risk of upsetting the notation some-
what, this function %vill be denoted 5(R).
Any zero of 5(B) that involves a negative
stationary interest rate is not an equilibrium of
the model, so atlention can be restricted to B >
0. If aggregate savings is strictly increasing in
stationary interest rates B > 0, then there can
be at most one zero of the aggregate savings
function for R > 0. It turns out that this is
indeed the case. First, consider 5(R) as B
approaches zero from the positive side. Inspec-
tion of table I shows that this limit is negative
infinity. Next, consider SW) as H becomes very
large. The limit in this case is positive infinity.
Thus, 5(R) tends to mci-ease with increases in B.
It may, however, decrease over some ranges of
B. To show that this is not the case, consider
the derivative of 5(B) with respect to H, which is
given in appendix 2. This derivative is always
positive, and thus aggregate savings is strictly
increasing in stationary interest rates R > 0.
The above argument is summarized in figure
1, which shows a graph of SW) against B. Since
W(t+1)[1~1
[a















The Existence of Steady-State Equilibria
SW) is strictly increasing in B, for R > 0, only
one of the zeros of the aggregate savings func-
tion can occur at a point where the interest
iate is positive. All Zn —4 of the remaining
zeros, if they exist, must occur at points where
the interest rate is negative. Therefore, exactly
one stationary equilibrium exists in this model
where S = 0. A second equilibrium, a stationary
monetary equilihriuni, may exist if aggregate
savings is positive when B = a. This condition is
the suhject of the next portion of the paper.
(l’aadiiinns (Dr VAh.tad EEa.E
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In the system described by equation 4, there
is always a candidate equilibrium at B = a.
If savings is positive at this steady state, then
fiat currency has positive value, and the defini-
tion of equilibrium is satisfied. The condition
for fiat currency to he valued in equilihrium in
this model is therefore found by evaluating SW)
at B = a and comparing the result to zero. When
there is no population growth (a = 1) and no dis-
counting (/3 = 1), this condition is
~ Lw~i— 1Y (n_,J—i~1~> 0.
2
As an example, let n = 2. Then the condition for
valued fiat currency is that n~ (t) > w U + 1),
which is a standard result from analogous two-
period lifetime models.
The condition given in inequality 5 is simple
and symmetric. Endowments received in the
first half of agents’ lives contribute positively to
satisfying the condition, while endowments
received in the second half detract from that
satisfaction. The endowment receiving the largest
weight is the one received by agents in their
First period of life, vr~(t),and the weights fall
linearly with the endowments received in later
periods of life. The weight on the endowment
received in the last period of life, vyU + n — I), is
the smallest (it is a large negative weight). The
endowment received by agents at the midpoint
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A common criticism of the two-period overlap-
ping generations model is that the condition for
valueni fiat currency is w(f) > w(l + I), which
implies declining endowments through an
agent’s lifetime. If the endowment stream is
interpreted as a lifetime productivity profile,
most economists would have hump-shaped
patterns in mind to repi-esent the empirical
reality. Productivity is low when people first
enter the work force but iises steadily through
life before dropping off sharply at retiremnent.
The condition for valued fiat currency in the n-
period model can in fact accommodate the
hump-shaped endowment pattern many have in
mind. In figure 2, an illustrative case is preset~t-
ed, where, in a 55-period model, the condition
for valued fiat currency is met and the lifetime
endowment pattern is plausibly hump-shaped.
Both the discount factoi /3 and the gross rate
the condition for valued fiat curt-ency. First,
consider the situation in which agents discount
the future (/3 < I), but in which there is no
population growth. Results due to Aiyagari
(1988, 1989) suggest that, if the numnher of peri-
ods is large (n is large), fiat currency cannot be
valued in equilibrium in this situation. As men-
tioned in the introduction, this is a rather nega-
tive conclusion, since most economists helieve
that people do discount the future. It is there-
fore important to see that discounting does not
play such a large role, even when n is large.
‘l’he condition in this case is
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of population gm-owth a have a role to play inTable 2
Values of B When n Is Large, Choosing /3 Appropriately
Appropriate /3 Value of BB if (3 = 1 Percentage increase
n=2 .54 .65 .5 30.0%
n=10 .86 5.71 4.5 26.9
n=30 .95 18.35 14.5 26.6
n=55 .97 34.14 27.0 26.4
n=220 .9926 138.36 109.5 26.4
n=660 .9975 416.28 329.5 26.3
‘The effects of discounting can he found by con-
sidering B, since /3 enters the condition only
through this term. When /3 = 1, this ratio of
sums is (n — 1hZ. When /3 C 1, the present case,
the value of B will be greater than (n — 1)72, and
one can immediately conclude that discounting
will make the condition for valued fiat currency
mon-c difficult to satisfy than if then-e were no
discounting.
When [3=0, which represents the extreme
case in which agents discount the future coin-
pletely and cai-e only ahout today’s consump-
tion, the value of B is n—i. An examination of
inequality 6 shows that all the weights on all
the endowments would be less than or equal to
zero in this case, and thus that the condition
for valued fiat currency could never be satis-
fied, no matter what the endowment pattern.
This fact is important because, for values of
/3 hetween zero and one, B tends to n—i when
n is large. Hence, a version of Aiyagari’s (1988)
result is illustrated: if n is large enough and
agents discount the future, fiat money cannot
have value in equilibrium. There is more to this
condition, however.
In particular, the similarity between the
extreme case of complete discounting (/3=0) and
the case of some discounting (/3 between zero
and one) with n large is not accidental.
In the overlapping generations model, n periods
constitute a human lifetimne. When 11 is made
larger and larger, the lifetime is measured in
smaller and smaller units of time. In fact, one
motivation for considering ti-period overlapping
generations models was to get to a time period
that could be interpreted as a quarter or a
month. The discount factor /3 is therefore not
independent of n. Keeping /3 fixed and allowing
n to approach infinity has the same effect as
letting /3 approach zero. Some simple calcula-
tions hear this fact out -
The discount factor /3 is equal to 17(1 + 6),
where 6 is the discount i-ate. Many economists
think the annual discount rate is about .03, so
that /3 would be about .97. But this is only on
an annual hasis; on a quarterly or monthly
basis, a new value of /3 must he calculated.
Otherwise, one would he saying that people
discount the futum-e at a rate of 3 percent Per
quarter or 3 percent per month—in other
words, at a much more rapid rate. In the limit,
a discount rate of 3 percent per day or hour oi-
mninute would be implied. Agents would be
discounting the future completely. This is why
letting n become large with a fixed [3 C 1.
approximates the case where /3=0.
Tahle 2 shows values of B for various values
of ii when /3 is chosen to appropriately reflect
the length of a Lime period implied by the
choice of n. The case of n = 55 is taken to repre-
sent a model where a time pei-iod is a year, and
hence the discount factor is set at .97. Other
values of /3 are chosen relative to this standard,
so that n = 220 represents a quarterly model and
n = 660 represents a monthly model. Values of n
less than 55 involve time periods longen- than a
year. The second column in the table shows the
value of B under discounting, while the third
column shows the value of B for the no-
discounting case (/3 = 1). The final column shows
the increase in B due to discounting. Since B
represents a negative part in the condition for
fiat currency to be valued (see inequality 6), the
figures in the final column give some sense of
the effect of discounting on the condition fot
valued fiat currency. In particular, B is about 26
percent larger under discounting than it is in
the no-discounting case, as n gets large.78
Remarkably, smaller values of n overstate this
effect, so that in models with large n it is
actually somewhat easier to mneet the condition
for valued fiat currency.
According to the inequality in (6), B affects all
of the endowments equally. The weight on the
endowment that agents receive in the first
period of their lives, u~ (t), is still positive,
although less so than in the no-discounting case.
Similarly, the weight on the endowment that
agents receive in the last pei-iod of life is now
more negative. In Fact, the weights still decline
linearly with endowments received in later
periods of life, hut the point at which the
weight on an endowment is zero occurs, not at
midlife, but somewhat before midlife. Hence,
the endowment pattern will have to involve
lam-ger endowments earlier in life if fiat currency
is to have value, relative to the no-discounting
case. In terms of hump-shaped endowment
patterns, the peak endowment would have to
occur’ earlier in an agent’s lifetime.
In summary, while discounting makes the con-
dition for valued fiat currency more stringent,
this effect has a limit once it is recognized that
the discount rate is not independent of the
numhem- of periods in this model.
I
It has long heen recognized in research on
over-lapping generations models of money that
including population growth (sometimes inter-
pm-eted as a model in which the economy is
growing) mitigates the effects of discounting on
the condition for valued fiat currency. In fact,
in the two-period case, these effects cancel
exactly when the discount rate is equal to the
rate of population growth (that is, when /3 = a I)
Of course, because the time period in this mod-
el is a fraction of a human lifetime, population
growth rates, like discount rates,, are not in-
dependent of n.
In the pm-esent model with n periods, the
condition For valued fiat cum-rency when both
population growth (a> 1) and discounting (flC 1)
are allowed is given by
(7) ~uçU+i—1)a i(n_0_B1 > o.
Thus, the weight on the endowment received
by agents in the first period of their lives is
unchanged relative to the case with no popula-
tion growth, but the weights on endowments
received in successive periods are reduced by
ever greater powers of a. Since interest centers
on the case in which population is growing, a
> 1, and since the endowments received in the
middle and later periods of life receive negative
weights, one conclusion is that allowing popula-
tion growth makes it somewhat easier to satisfy
the condition for valued fiat currency.
In a special situation, the negative effects of
discounting and the positive effects of popula-
tion growth on the condition for valued fiat
currency cancel out exactly. In particular, if all
of the endowments received by agents in each
period of their lives are exactly equal, then the
condition for- valued fiat currency when /3 = a
is the same as the condition when /3=a=i. In
other words, setting the population growth rate
equal to the discount rate produces no net ef-
fects only in the special case when the endow-
ment stream is constant. The details of this
argument are given in appendix 3. ‘This result is
a small depam-ture from standard results for the
two-period model. When ii = 2, the condition for
valued fiat currency is a[3r’nç(t) > u~U + 1), so that
setting the rate of population growth equal to
the discount rate al%vays produces exactly off-
setting effects, regardless of the endowment
pattern. This effect generalizes to the n-period
case only when all the endowments are equal.24
MAIn’ ., .~Nfl~ ~S~fl~MS
Samnuelson’s model of money, which has
generally been formulated in terms of two-
period lifetimes, is often criticized as heing un-
240ne final comment is appropriate on the condition ton fiat
currency to have value. Aiyagani (1989) has claimed that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is important and
must be larger than one for fiat currency to have value if
the discount rate is less than the rate of population growth
(and n is large). In the present example with logarithmic
utility, the elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to
unity. But it is still a simple matter to find plausible endow-
ment patterns that will permit fiat currency to have value.
rrrwr’u PrCrIrrN,”.I (1= Cl’realistic, since a time period in the model is on
the order of 25 years. A basic version of an
n-period model is investigated in this paper.
The key assumptions are that agents are identi-
cal within and across generations, and that they
possess time-separable logarithmic utility func-
tions. The fact that agent lifetimes are divided
into n periods instead of two periods induces a
complicated aggregate savings function that
depends on a plethora of interest rates and
endowments-
Although the economy analyzed in this paper,
assuming agents possess perfect foresight, is
characterized by a high-order differenceequation
which has 2n-2 candidate stationary equilibria,
there are at most two stationary equilibria of
the model. Furthermore, these stationary
equilibria are the same two, the autarkic
equilibrium and the monetary equilibrium, that
may exist in the two-period model. The welfare
properties of these equilibria wet-c not analyzed.
The condition for fiat currency to have value
in the n-period case allows for plausibly hump-
shaped endowment patterns. When the agents
in the model discount future consumption, the
condition for valued fiat currency becomes
more difficult to meet. There is a limit to this
effect, however, and monetary steady states can
exist even when the number of periods in the
model is large. An allowance for population
growth makes the condition for valued fiat
currency easier to meet. ‘I’hese results, taken
together, suggest that Samuelson’s framework,
at least in a broad sense, is robust to extensions
in the number of time periods in the model.
At least four central concerns about Samuel-
son’s model of money are distinct from, and
perhaps more important than, the time period
prohlem addressed in this paper. The first is
that the analysis in this paper places heavy reli-
ance on the arbitrage condition which equated
rates of return across alternative assets. In actual
economies, money is dominated in rate of return
by alternative risk-free assets. A second central
concern is that the role of storage has not been
considered. In addition, the agents in this model
do not leave bequests to future generations.
Finally, production has not been considered.
These deficiencies require remedies and exten-
sions other than those discussed here.
Finally, it is perhaps useful to distinguish the
interpretation of the n-period model used in this
paper from interpretations based on the idea of
“long-lived agents.” ln some research, agents
with two-period lifetimes have been viewed as
living a short time, and n-period models, letting
n approach infinity, have been regarded as
approximations to models with agents who
possess infinite planning horizons. In the
interpretation offered in the present paper, the
agents in the model do not really live any
longer, their lifetimes am-c just divided up into
smaller fragments.
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Derivation of’ the aggregate snvi.ngsjtnneti~on
Denoting /‘(i) as the amount of one-period For the logarithmic utility function given in the
loans made by agent a of generation t at date I, text, the first-order conditions are given by
an individual agent faces the following problem,
assuming n is large:





c~(t+2)+/’(t+2) S w~(l+2)+R(f+t)l~(t+I) c~(t+n_fl=~fl’~flfl(t+jy1.
j’—O
c8t+n—2)+1’(t+n—2) s w’(t+n—2)
These first-order conditions can be comnbmned
+R(f+n—3)1~U+n—3) into the budget constraint to yield
c2(t+n—I) S w~(l +n— 1)+R(t+n—2)!(t+n—2). .
c~(f)LP’=w$l) + ~j w~(t+i)JJR(t+j)’.
The constraints in this problem can be written ‘° “
more concisely by eliminating 1~,which yields
To construct an expression for aggregate
c~(t)+L c~(l+i)fIR(t+j)1 w~(t) savings, define
+~ w~(f+i)fJR(t+j)~. w;=[L~f’ w~fl+~W~(t+i)fJR(t+J)’1
i—I i~ii i—I j.’k’ i
CCflCOA~ CCC’CC~UCC~A ‘CC’ fIt CC’ ‘ CCwhich is equal to c~U)when k=I. ‘The savings savings of each generation held at time t. Here
of agent a period by period can be written as the assumption of identical endowment
profiles, which implies that, for instance,
1~(t)=w~(t)—c$U) w~U+I)=w~,U,is employed. Back-dating there-
Iore implies
r; It+1) = w~U +1) + RU) 1~U) - c~ (f + I)
1~ (t+ 2) = w~U + 2) + RU +1) 1~ (t+ I) - c~(t +2) 1 At) = w’~(t) —
1~~U) = w~ U + 1)+RU-I) w~(t) -(1 + fi) RU -1 )W~
- /,U)=w~U+2)+RU- 1)w~U+ 1)
1~(t+n—3)=w~U+n—3)+RU+n-4) l~1+n—4) +RU—2)RU—1) w~U)—(1+fl+fljRU-2)RU—flw
—c~’(t+n—3)




The savings of agent a can be defined in terms
of W~ by recursive substitutions as
-U+fl+...+fl”2) W’fl HRU-fl.
1 (t) = w~U) —W~
/“U+ 1)= u” (t+ 1)+RU) w”U) —u +fi)RU)W’ Aggregate savings is the sum of these amounts, I‘ weighted appropriately for the number of
lU+2)=w~U+2)+RU+1)w~U+fl+RU+1JR(t)w’~(t) agents in each generation. Since the gross rate
—u +J3+j32)RU)RU+1)W” of population growth, a, is constant, the genera- tion born at date / —1 is always smaller by a
factor of 1/a relative to the generation born at
date t. Normalizing population of the date t = 0
1~(i +n —2) = w~U +n—2) +RU + n — 3)w~U +n —3)... generation to one yields the following expres-
‘I-a •n,a sion for aggiegate savings In 3):
+w~U)HRU+j)-(1+p+...+r2)w~UR(t+j). ‘i-Z n-a fl-2-,• j
5W=~a1 wAt+i)+ ~ ~a’-’-’w,U+i) JJ RU—k)
Since all agents are the same, these equations “~
represent the savings of every agent in the ~a’W1—~ ~ja’-’/3’W ~ RU—k)
economy over the life of the agent. By back- ~‘i J~iI ‘k-i
dating these loan amounts to time t, a set of
loan amounts can be found that describes the as given in the text.
i’:t.l.ft$flji&’ttf..id,t.. .;I
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The derivative is given by
ds ZR 3R2 (n—2)Th’3 [u+P)yI+P+P2)ZR ÷U+fl+...+fl°2)(n—2)R~~
+ a~’2
— a a2 a~2
LL i+p+/r+... +fl~
211 3R~ (n—3)R”4 I
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2
LL
+ wIt +2)~ .1+... — w,U + n —By inspection, it is apparent that potentially —(1_+/3+fr)2RwU)fx’i~-i.1-I -
-. . - . F .. /3’ is offset by the positive
negative portions of this derivative are offset by a2
larger positive terms. For instance, the term term ZRw,(l)/a2. Hence, the derivative is positive.
2.4
72 ~ / ,,~ 4
±~“> 7 44_4 ~, ~ ~~4( I,’ ‘ f~4~2,4~ - --
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When the endowments received by agents in each
period are equal, setting fl=a~implies no net ef- (n_I)+~2)+(11~3)+...+ 1
feet on the condition foi’ valued fiat currency. L a a-
Equal endowments implies that the condition is r 1
—BI I+!+1+,..+ I>o.
> 0. L a a2 a”2 J
If this sum is exactly zero, it would be equiva- The term multiplying B cancels with the
lent to the condition with no discounting and denonunator of B (see the text) when /3 = a -
no population growth, that is, a=J3=I. The sum The first sum is simply the numerator of B
is exactly zero when /3=a’. To see this, write when J3=a”m. Hence, this sum is zero when
the sum as